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Abstract
Web-fraud is one of the most unpleasant features
of today’s Internet. Two well-known examples of
fraudulent activities on the web are phishing and ty-
posquatting. Their effects range from relatively be-
nign (such as unwanted ads) to downright sinister (es-
pecially, when typosquatting is combined with phish-
ing). This paper presents a novel technique to detect
web-fraud domains that utilize HTTPS. To this end,
we conduct the first comprehensive study of SSL cer-
tificates. We analyze certificates of legitimate and
popular domains and those used by fraudulent ones.
Drawing from extensive measurements, we build a
classifier that detects such malicious domains with
high accuracy.
Keywords: SSL Certificates, Phishing, Typosquatting
1 Introduction
The Internet and its main application – the web –
have been growing continuously in recent years. In
the last three years, Web contents have doubled in
size, from 10 billion to over 20 billion pages [10]. Un-
fortunately, this growth has been accompanied by a
parallel increase in nefarious activities, as reported
by [38]. Indeed, the web is an appealing platform
for various types of electronic fraud, such as phishing
and typosquatting.
Phishing aims to elicit sensitive information – e.g.,
user names, passwords or credit card details – from
unsuspecting users. It typically starts with a user be-
ing directed to a fake website with the look-and-feel of
a legitimate, familiar and/or well-known one. Conse-
quences of phishing range from denial-of-service to
full-blown identity theft, followed by real financial
losses. In 2007, more than 3 billion U.S. dollars were
lost because of phishing [26].
Typosquatting is the practice of registering do-
main names that are typographical errors (or minor
spelling variations) of addresses of well-known web-
sites (target domains) [51]. It is often related to do-
main parking services and advertisement syndication,
i.e., instructing browsers to fetch advertisements from
a server and blending them with content of the web-
site that the user intends to visit [51]. In addition
to displaying unexpected pages, typo-domains often
display malicious, offensive and unwanted content,
or install malware [14, 45]. Certain typo-domains of
children-oriented websites were found to even redirect
users to adult content [27]. Worse yet, typo-domains
of financial websites can serve as natural platforms
for passive phishing attacks.1
Recent studies have assessed popularity of both
types of malicious activities, e.g., [41, 3]. In the fall
of 2008, McAfee Alert Labs found more than 80, 000
domains typosquatting on just the top 2, 000 web-
sites [11]. According to the Anti-phishing Working
Group (APWG), the number of reported phishing
attacks between April 2006 and April 2007 exceeded
300, 000 [4]. In August 2009, 56, 632 unique phish-
ing websites were reported by APWG – the highest
number in APWG’s history [5]. Nevertheless, these
problems remain far from solved.
Our goal is to counter web-fraud by detecting do-
mains hosting such malicious activities. Our ap-
proach is inspired by recent discussions in the web-
security community. Security researchers and prac-
titioners have been increasingly advocating a transi-
tion to HTTPS for all web transactions, similar to
that from Telnet to SSH. Examples of such discus-
sions can be found in [46], [47], and [13]. Our work
is also a response to an alarming trend observed by
a recent study [36]: the emergence of sophisticated
phishing attacks abusing SSL certificates. These at-
tacks rely on SSL to avoid raising users’ suspicion, by
masquerading as legitimate “secure” websites.
1Passive phishing attacks do not rely on email/spam cam-
paigns to lead people to access the fake website. Instead,
users who mis-type a common domain name end up being
directed to a phishing website.
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This brings us to the following questions:
1. To what extent is HTTPS adopted on the Inter-
net?
2. How different are SSL certificates used by web-
fraudsters from those of legitimate domains?
3. Can we use information in SSL certificates to
identify web-fraud activities, such as phishing
and typosquatting, without compromising user
privacy?
1.1 Roadmap
First, we measure the overall prevalence of HTTPS
in popular and randomly sampled Internet domains.
Next, we consider popularity of HTTPS in the con-
text of web-fraud by studying its use in phishing and
typosquatting activities. Finally, we analyze, for the
first time, all fields in SSL certificates and identify
useful features and patterns that can help identify
web-fraud.
Leveraging our measurements, we propose a novel
technique to identify web-fraud domains that use
HTTPS. We construct a classifier that analyzes cer-
tificates of such domains. We validate our classifier
by training and testing it over data collected from
the Internet. The classifier achieves a detection ac-
curacy ranging from 99%, in the worst-case, to 96%.
It only relies on data stored in SSL certificates and
does not require any user information. Our classifier
is orthogonal to prior mitigation techniques and can
be integrated with other methods (that do not rely
on HTTPS), thus improving overall effectiveness and
facilitating detection of a wider range of malicious
domains. This might encourage legitimate websites
that require sensitive user information (thus, poten-
tial phishing targets) to enforce HTTPS.
Finally, we highligh some indirect benefits of
HTTPS: it does not only guarantee confidentiality
and authenticity, but can also help combat web-fraud.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is or-
ganized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly overview
X.509 certificates. Section 3 presents the rationale
and details of our measurements, as well as their
analysis. In Section 4, we describe details of a novel
classifier that detects malicious domains, based on in-
formation obtained from SSL certificates. Section 5
discusses implications of our findings and limitations
of our solution. Section 6 overviews related work.
Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
Figure 1: X.509 certificate format.
2 X.509 Certificates
The term X.509 certificate usually refers to an
IETF’s PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile of the
X.509 v3 certificate standard, as specified in RFC
5280 [9]. In this paper we are concerned with the
public key certificate portion of X.509. In the rest
of the paper, we refer to the public key certificate
format of X.509 as a certificate, or an SSL/HTTPS
certificate.
According to X.509, a Certification Authority (CA)
issues a certificate binding a public key to an X.500
Distinguished Name (or to an Alternative Name, e.g.,
an e-mail address or a DNS-entry). Web-browsers –
such as Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome and Sa-
fari – come with pre-installed trusted root certificates.
Browser software makers determine which CAs are
trusted third parties. Root certificates can be manu-
ally removed or disabled, however, it is unlikely that
typical users do so. The general structure of an X.509
v3 [9] certificate is presented in Figure 1. As dis-
cussed later in Section 3, we analyze all fields in cer-
tificates collected from both legitimate and malicious
domains.
3 Measurements and Analysis
of SSL Certificates
In this section, we describe our data sets and our
collection methodology. We then present our analysis
leading to the design of a classifier that detects web-
fraud domains.
2
3.1 HTTPS Usage and Certificate
Harvest
Our measurement data was collected during the
following periods: (1) from September to October
2009, and (2) from March to October 2010. We in-
clude three types of domain sets: Popular, Random
and Malicious (Phishing and Typosquatting). Each
domain was probed twice. We probed each domain
for web existence (by sending an HTTP request to
port 80) and for HTTPS existence (by sending an
HTTPS request to port 443). We harvested the SSL
certificate when a domain responded to HTTPS. Ta-
ble 1 lists our data sets and the number of corre-
sponding SSL certificates.
Popular Domains Data Set. The Alexa [2] top
10, 000 domains were used as our data set for popular
domains. Alexa is a subsidiary of Amazon.com known
for its web-browser toolbar and for reporting traffic
ranking of Internet websites. The company does not
provide exact information on the number of users us-
ing its toolbar, but it claims several millions [1]. We
use Alexa ranking as a popularity measure for legiti-
mate domains. From the top 10, 000 Alexa domains,
we collected certificates from 2, 984 different domains
(Table 1). Only 2, 679 of these certificates are unique.
13.5% of domains have identical certificates to some
other domain in the same data set. Some popular
domains belong to the same owner and represent the
same company, e.g., google.co.in and google.de.
In this paper, we refer to this data set as Alexa set.
Random Domain Data Set. We randomly sam-
pled .com and .net domains to create a data set that
represents a random portion of the web, i.e., allegedly
benign but “unpopular” domains. We created this
data set to test whether (or not) certificates of ran-
dom domains contain similar features to those of ei-
ther popular or malicious domains. We randomly
sampled 100, 000 domains from the .com Internet
Zone File (and 100, 000 from the .net counterpart).
The .com/.net Internet Zone Files have been collected
from VeriSign [44]. After sampling the Zone Files, we
downloaded existing SSL certificates and, as shown in
Table 1, we obtained 22, 063 different domains with
their SSL certificates. Some of these certificates were
Data set Type Number of Certificates
Alexa Popular 2,984
*.com/*.net Random 22,063
Phishing Malicious 5,175
Typosquatting Malicious 486
Table 1: Description of data sets and correspond-
ing number of certificates.
duplicates(16, 342 unique certificates). The percent-
age of domains having the same certificate as another
domain in the same data set in this case is 36.4%. In
this paper, we refer to this data set as *.com/*.net
set.
3.1.1 Malicious Data Set
Phishing. We collected SSL certificates of 5, 175
different domains of phishing urls. The number of
unique certificates is 2, 310 (Table 1). Phishing do-
mains were obtained from the PhishTank website [33]
as soon as they were listed. Reported URLs in Phish-
Tank are verified by several users and, as a result, are
malicious with very high probability. We consider
this data set as a baseline for phishing domains. The
percentage of domains that have an identical certifi-
cate as another domain within the data set is 63%.
This is a significant increase compared to the pop-
ular and random sets. One possible explanation is
related to the fact that a large portion of phishing
certificates are self signed. These certificates are gen-
erated locally and then re-used for several domains
under the control of the same malicious entity. In
this paper, we refer to this data set as Phishing set.
Typosquatting. In order to collect SSL certificates
of typosquatting domains, we first identified the typo
domains in our *.com/*.net random domains by using
Google’s typo correction service [18]. This resulted in
38, 617 possible typo domains. However, these might
be benign domains that accidentally resembled typos
of well-known domains. We identified the typosquat-
ting domains in this set by detecting the parked do-
mains among them, using the machine-learning-based
classifier proposed in [22]. Note that typosquatters
profit from traffic that accidentally comes to their
domains. One common way of achieving this is to
host typosquatting domains from a domain parking
service. Parked domains [17] are ads-portal domains
that show ads provided by a third-party service called
a parking service, in the form of ads-listing [51] so
typosquatters may profit from incoming traffic (e.g.,
if a visitor clicks on a sponsored link). We discov-
ered that 9, 830 out of 38, 617 were parked domains.
We consider these 9, 830 names as the data set of ty-
posquatting domains. We then probed these domains
to get their SSL certificates.
As reported in Table 1, our Typosquatting data set
is composed of 486 domains, i.e., the parked domains
having HTTPS and responding with SSL certificates.
However, note that only 100 out of 486 certificates
are unique. The percentage of domains that have a
duplicate certificate with another domain in this data
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Feature Name Type Notes
F1 md5 boolean The signature algorithm of the certificate is md5WithRSAEncryption
F2 bogus subject boolean The subject section of the certificate is clearly bogus
F3 self-signed boolean The certificate is self-signed
F4 host-common-name-sim boolean Whether the common name of the subject and domain name
of the certificate has the same basic part of the domain
F5 issuer common string The common name of the issuer
F6 issuer organization string The organization name of the issuer
F7 issuer country string The country name of the issuer
F8 subject country string The country name of the subject
F9 validity duration integer The validity period in days
Table 2: Features extracted from SSL certificates.
set is 87%. In this paper, we refer to this data set as
Typosquatting set.
We acknowledge that the size of the Typosquatting
data set is relatively limited. Therefore, we do not
claim conclusive results from its analysis, but we in-
clude it for completeness. We believe that the limited
size of the Typosquatting set is due to the lack of in-
centives from using HTTPS in this context. Using
HTTPS in typosquatting domains does not help in
luring users (unlike Phishing). Nonetheless, we be-
lieve that, being the first of its kind, such an analysis
of HTTPS-enabled typosquatting domains is interest-
ing and shows an initial insight into this fraudulent
activity.
3.2 Certificate Analysis
The goal of this analysis is to guide the design of
our detection method, i.e., the classifier presented in
Section 4. One side-benefit is to reveal differences
between certificates used by fraudulent and legiti-
mate/popular domains. In total, we identified 9 rel-
evant certificate features, listed in Table 2. (Other
features and fields (e.g., RSA exponent, Public Key
Size, ...) had no substantial differences between le-
gitimate and malicious domains and we omit them
here.) Most features map to actual certificate fields,
e.g., F1 and F2. Others are computed from certificate
fields but are not directly reflected in the certificate,
e.g., host-common-name-sim (F4). Some features are
boolean, whereas, others are integers, reals or strings.
The computation of features is performed on all the
certificates (including the duplicates) as our goal is
to identify malicious domains (regardless of its cer-
tificates being duplicates or not).
3.2.1 Analysis of Certificate Boolean Fea-
tures
Features F1-F4 have boolean values, e.g., F1 (md5)
is true if the signature algorithm used in the certifi-
cate is “md5WithRSAEncryption.” The results of
Feature Alexa *.com/*.net Phishing Typosquatting
F1 9.9% 27.4% 17.4% 26.1%
F2 7.7% 11.8% 18.3% 29.8%
F3 15.8% 35.4% 30.6% 53.5%
F4 74.3% 10.4% 9.8% 0%
Table 3: Analysis of boolean certificate features
(percentages satisfying each feature).
analyzing these features are summarized in Table 3.
This analysis reveals interesting and unexpected is-
sues and differences between legitimate and malicious
domains.
F1 (md5)
Observe that 9.9% of Alexa certificates use
“md5WithRSAEncryption”, much less than those
in *.com/*.net (27.4%), Phishing (17.4%) and Ty-
posquatting (26.1%). Note that rogue certificates can
be constructed using MD5 ([39], [40]). The differ-
ence in the percentages may indicate that many of
*.com/*.net, Phishing and Typosquatting certificates
are issued without a significant effort to check their
security.
F2 (bogus subject)
A bogus subject indicates whether the subject fields
have some bogus values (e.g., “ST=somestate”,
“O=someorganization”, “CN=localhost”, ...). We
identified a list of such meaningless values and consid-
ered subjects to be bogus if they contain one of these
values. 7.7% of Alexa certificates satisfy this feature
(similar percentage in *.com/*.net ). This percentage
is much higher (18.3%) in Phishing and Typosquatting
(29.8%) . This indicates that web-fraudsters fill sub-
ject values with bogus data or leave default values
when generating certificates.
F3 (self-signed)
15.8% of Alexa certificates are self-signed, some-
how unexpectedly. One possible explanation is that
4
some of the popular domains in the Alexa set rep-
resent companies having their own CA and issuing
their own certificates (e.g., google, microsoft, yahoo
...etc.). The percentages of self-signed certificates in
*.com/*.net, Phishing, and Typosquatting is higher
(resp., 35.4%, 30.6% and 53.5%). This is expected for
Phishing, since miscreants would like to avoid leav-
ing any trace by obtaining a certificate from a CA
(which requires documentation and a payment). For
*.com/*.net, a higher percentage could be explained
by the use of locally generated certificates, e.g., using
OpenSSL [31]. The difference between Alexa on one
side and Phishing, Typosquatting, and *.com/*.net on
the other side is quite significant (more than 14%).
F4 (host-common-name-sim)
We expect the common name in the subject field to be
very similar to the hostname in popular domain cer-
tificates, while we intuitively expect this to be lower
in malicious domain certificates, e.g., because mali-
cious domains may not use complying SSL certifi-
cates. In order to assess this, we define a feature
called “host-common-name sim“. This feature mea-
sures the similarity between domain name of the SSL
certificate and common name of the subject field in it.
For instance, if the hostname and common name are
www.google.com.sa and google.com respectively,
host-common-name-sim is set to true. Whereas,
if the hostname and common name are equal to
www.domain-x.com and www.domain-y.com, respec-
tively, the feature is set to false since domain-x is not
equal to domain-y.
74.3% of Alexa certificates satisfies this feature.
The percentages in *.com/*.net, Phishing, and Ty-
posquatting are 10.4% and 9.8%, 0% respectively.
The difference between Alexa on one side and Phish-
ing, Typosquatting, and *.com/*.net on the other side
is quite remarkable. This feature, together with the
previous one (excluding bogus subject), suggests that
there is some strong similarity among *.com/*.net,
Phishing, and Typosquatting certificates.
3.2.2 Analysis of Certificate Non-Boolean
Features
We now present the analysis of non-boolean fea-
tures. F5–F6 are related to the certificate issuer:
common name, organization name and country, while
F7–F8 are related to the country issuer or country
subject and F9 is related the validity duration.
Feature Sets APCR
issuer common name Phishing Alexa 52.7%
issuer common name Phishing *.com/*.net 51.2%
issuer organization name Phishing Alexa 57.7%
issuer organization name Phishing *.com/*.net 46%
issuer country Phishing Alexa 28.4%
issuer country Phishing *.com/*.net 18.6%
subject country Phishing Alexa 26.5%
subject country Phishing *.com/*.net 24%
Table 4: APCR values.
F5 (issuer common name) and F6 (issuer or-
ganization)
First, we noticed that some values of issuers’ com-
mon names are popular in only one domain set. For
example, 10.1% of Phishing certificates are issued
by UTN-USERFIRST-HARDWARE (only 4.2(5.3)%
in Alexa(*.com/*.net)). Similarly, some issuers’ or-
ganization names are popular only in one domain
set. For example, 9.6% of Phishing certificates have
COMODO-CA-LIMITED as their issuer’s organiza-
tion name, as opposed to 2.1% in Alexa and 3.2% in
*.com/*.net certificates.
To elaborate more on the difference of the is-
suer common name between any two domain data
sets, A against B, we extract all issuer common
names that are more popular(in terms of ratio) in
set A than in B. We name these popular com-
mon names Popular-Issuer-Common-Name-A-
B. Then, we compute what percentage of the certifi-
cates in A and B that have their issuer common name
in Popular-Common-Name-A-B. In a similar
way, we extract Popular-Issuer-Organization-A-
B, Popular-Issuer-Country-A-B, and Popular-
Subject-Country-A-B sets corresponding to is-
suer organization, issuer country, and subject coun-
try. Table 5 shows the ratios when A is Phishing
and B is Alexa or *.com/*.net. For issuer common
name(issuer organization name), we can clearly no-
tice the difference in ratios between Phishing and
Alexa(*.com/*.net) which emphasizes on the differ-
ences of issuer common name(issuer organization
name) feature among the domain sets (The ratios
when A is Alexa or *.com/*.net suggest similar con-
clusions).
To quantify the difference in issuer’s com-
mon/organization name, we measure change in the
posterior probabilities of phishing certificates, i.e.,
the probability that a certificate is phishing given
the common/organization name is equal to a specific
value. To this end, we merge Phishing and Alexa sets
and observe how the posterior probability changes.
Similarly, we merge Phishing and *.com/*.net sets. In
order to measure the changes in the posterior proba-
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Feature Sets Ratio A Ratio B
issuer common name Phishing Alexa 72% 23%
issuer common name Phishing *.com/*.net 79% 31%
issuer organization name Phishing Alexa 88% 33%
issuer organization name Phishing *.com/*.net 76% 34%
issuer country Phishing Alexa 92% 65%
issuer country Phishing *.com/*.net 33% 15%
subject country Phishing Alexa 55% 30%
subject country Phishing *.com/*.net 60% 28%
Table 5: The table shows the ratios of Popular-Issuer-Common-Name-A-B, Popular-Issuer-
Organization-A-B, Popular-Issuer-Country-A-B and Popular-Subject-Country-A-B in set A and B.
In this table, A is Phishing and B is either Alexa or *.com/*.net.
bility, we borrow the metric in [22], i.e., called Aver-
age Posterior Change Ratio APCR. In the following
we define APCR. Note that Pp stands for posterior
probability of phishing certificates and Pa stands for
prior probability of being a phishing certificate. In
the following, I stands for a common name issuer
value2:
APCR =
∑
∀I
Pp Change Ratio in I × Fraction of Certif. in I
where
Pp Change Ratio in I =
|Pp in I− Pa|
Max PP Displacement in I
and
Max Pp Displacement in I =
{
1 − Pa ifPpin I > Pa
Pa otherwise
The Posterior Change Ratio measures relative
change of posterior probability Pp from the prior
probability , Pa. For instance, a value of 0 indi-
cates no relative change and a value of 1 indicates
the largest relative change. Note that the average is
weighted, such that more “weight” is given to com-
mon names corresponding to more certificates (For
more information, readers can refer to [22]).
Table 4 shows the APCR of for issuer’s common
name. When we merge Phishing and Alexa sets, we
obtain an APCR value of 52.7% (51.2% for Phishing
and *.com/*.net). This indicates that change in pos-
terior probability is quite significant. Table 4 shows
similar APCR values for issuer’s organization name.
F6 and F7 (issuer and subject countries)
Similarly, some of issuers’ country names are pop-
ular only in one data set. For example, 10.3% of
Phishing certificates have GB as their issuer’s country
name (only 1.4% in Alexa and 4.3% in *.com/*.net).
Additionally, some of the subject country names are
2The APCR defined for issuer’s common name can be similarly
defined for issuer’s organization name, issuer’s country, and
subject country.
popular only in the Phishing set. For example, 5.3%
of Phishing certificates have FR as their country in
the subject field. This happens only in 2.2% of Alexa
certificates (0.9% in *.com/*.net).
Table 5, shows the ratios of domains that
have their certificates issuer country(subject coun-
try) in Popular-Issuer-Country-A-B (Popular-
Subject-Country-A-B) set where A is Phishing
and B is Alexa or *.com/*.net. The ratios in Phishing
and Alexa(*.com/*.net) have significant differences
which emphasizes on the differences of issuer coun-
try(subject country) feature among the domain sets.
Table 4 shows the APCR of the issuer country fea-
ture. When we combine the Phishing and Alexa sets,
we obtain an APCR value of 28.4% (18.6% for the
Phishing and *.com/*.net sets). This shows that there
is a change in the posterior probability, however, not
as significant as for the issuer common/organization
name. Table 4 also shows similar APCR values for
subject country feature which suggest similar conclu-
sions.
F9 (validity duration)
Table 6, shows the distribution of domains over dif-
ferent duration periods. As shown in the Table, do-
mains sets have different ratios for different periods.
For example, Phishing has the largest ratio when the
period is less than a year, *.com/*.net when the pe-
riod is in [365-729] days, and Alexa when the period
is in [730-1094] days. Additionally, we plot the CDF
of the certificate duration for different data sets in
Figure 2 which elaborates more on the differences.
3.2.3 Certificate Feature Analysis
We now discuss the most important observations:
1. For most of the features, distributions of mali-
cious certificates are significantly different from
Alexa certificates. Therefore, popular domains
can be easily differentiated from malicious do-
mains based on their SSL certificates.
6
Feature Alexa *.com/*.net Phishing
0 - 364 2.5% 4.2% 6.3%
365 - 729 51.7% 62.3% 49.6%
730 - 1094 26.1% 16.1% 20.1%
1095 - 3649 15.9% 11.1% 10.4%
3649 - 3.8% 6.3% 13.5%
Table 6: The table shows the distribution of do-
mains over different duration periods for different
domain sets.
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Figure 2: CDF of certificate duration.
2. A self signed certificate is more likely to be for
popular domain. The percentage of self signed
certificates in popular domains is only 15.8%.
3. We observe strong similarities between the
*.com/*.net set and malicious sets in many fea-
tures. One reason is that certificates in both
sets may be issued without applying appropri-
ate control, as opposed to certificates obtained
from popular Alexa domains. Another possible
explanation is that a large portion of certificates
from Phishing Typosquatting and *.com/*.net do-
mains are locally generated (e.g., self-signed) and
use the same default values from the employed
software (e.g., OpenSSL).
4. Host-common-name-sim feature is a very dis-
criminative feature in differentiating between
popular and other domains.
4 Certificate-based Classifier
The analysis above shows that several features have
distributions that vary among different data sets. Re-
lying on a single feature to identify malicious certifi-
cates will yield a high rate of false positives. There-
fore, we combine all features and feed them to a set
of machine learning classifiers in order to differen-
tiate among certificates belonging to different data
sets. We use several machine-learning-based classi-
fication algorithms and select the one with the best
performance. Specifically, we consider the following
algorithms: Random Forest [8], Decision Tree [34],
and Nearest Neighbor [28]. In addition, we explore
two optimization techniques for Decision Trees: Bag-
ging [7, 35] and Boosting [16, 35].
Nearest Neighbor classifier does not have a training
phase and it simply labels the incoming test record to
the most similar training record. Decition Tree clas-
sifier builds a tree that classifies a record by following
a path from the root to the leaf. To select a specific
branch, the record has to satisfy its condition. The
Random Forest classifier is derived from a multiple
of Decision Trees each of which has some selection
of the feature set. Since, detailed algorithm descrip-
tions are out of the scope of this paper, we refer to
[28, 7, 35, 16, 35] for relevant background informa-
tion.
We use precision-recall performance metrics to
summarize performance of a classifier. These metrics
consists of the following ratios: Positive Recall, Pos-
itive Precision, Negative Recall, and Negative Pre-
cision. We use the term “Positive” set to denote
Phishing (and *.com/*.net in one case) certificates
and “Negative” set to refer to Alexa (popular) cer-
tificates. The positive (negative) recall value is the
fraction of positive (negative) domains that are cor-
rectly identified by the classifier. Positive (negative)
precision is the actual fraction of positive (negative)
domains in the set identified by the classifier.
We evaluate the performance of the classifier using
the ten-fold cross validation method [28]. We ran-
domly divide the data set into 10 sets of equal size,
perform 10 different training/testing steps where each
step consists of training a classifier on 9 sets, and then
we test it on the remaining set. Finally, we average
all results to assess the final performance of the clas-
sifier.
4.1 Classifier Features
For feature F5 - issuer common name, we
extract 6 boolean sub-features each of which
corresponds to whether the domain certificate
issuer common name belongs to Popular-Issuer-
Country-A-B for a specific pair selection (A,
B). We try all the possible pair combina-
tions; specifically, (Phishing, Alexa), (Phishing,
*.com/*.net), (Alexa,*.com/*.net), (Alexa,Phishing),
(*.com/*.net,Alexa), and (*.com/*.net,Phishing).
This gives us the boolean sub-features issuer-
common-name-A-B. Similarly, we extract 6
sub-features from F6, F7, and F8 giving us issuer-
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Classifier Positive Positive Negative Negative
Recall Precision Recall Precision
Random 0.94 0.88 0.778 0.881
Forest
Decision Tree 0.939 0.881 0.779 0.88
Bagging 0.935 0.877 0.773 0.874
Decision Tree
Boosting 0.94 0.881 0.78 0.882
Decision Tree
Nearest 0.94 0.879 0.774 0.882
Neighbor
Table 7: Performance of classifiers - data set con-
sists of: (a)positive: Phishing certificates and (b)
negative: Alexa certificates.
Classifier Positive Positive Negative Negative
Recall Precision Recall Precision
Random 0.974 0.958 0.61 0.72
Forest
Decision Tree 0.975 0.958 0.611 0.727
Bagging - 0.972 0.96 0.631 0.708
Decision Tree
Boosting - 0.97.4 0.95.7 0.604 0.719
Decision Tree
Nearest 0.975 0.957 0.598 0.725
Neighbor
Table 8: Performance of Classifiers - data set con-
sists of: (a)positive: *.com/*.net and Phishing cer-
tificates and (b) negative: Alexa certificates.
organization-A-B, issuer-country-A-B, and
subject-country-A-B sub-features for 6 different
pairs of (A,B). It is these sub-features that we use
in the classifiers instead of F5-F8.
For feature F9 - validity duration, we convert it to
a nominal feature before feeding it to the classifier.
That is, for each domain validity duration, we convert
it to a nominal value by assigning it one of five values
corresponding to different duration periods shown in
Table 6.
For the other features, we use them as they are.
Note that in the classifier the Negative set is Alexa
and the positive set could be either Phishing or Phish-
ing and *.com/*.net. When the positive set is both
*.com/*.net and Phishing we use F1-F4, sub-features
of F5-F8, and the converted version of F9. When
the positive set is only Phishing, we use the same fea-
tures but we exclude all the sub-features that has
*.com/*.net in the pair combination.
4.2 Classifier Results
We first train the classifier on a data set that con-
sists of Alexa and Phishing certificates. The purpose
is to train the classifier to differentiate malicious from
popular certificates. Performance results of different
classifiers are shown in Table 7. Most of the clas-
sifiers have comparable performance results and the
phishing detection accuracy could be as high as 88%.
Since *.com/*.net certificates have similar distri-
butions as Phishing certificates in a number of fea-
tures, we also build a classifier that differentiates be-
tween very popular certificates (Alexa set) and non
popular sets (*.com/*.net and Phishing certificates).
The Positive data set consists of all certificates from
*.com/*.net and Phishing sets. The Negative data set
consists of all certificates in the Alexa set. One can
regard a certificate in the Positive set as a certificate
issued with due diligence, unlike one in the Negative
set. Thus, this classifier differentiates “neat” certifi-
cates from “sloppy” ones, indicating that the corre-
sponding domain might be malicious. The results of
our training is shown in Table 8. Note that all classi-
fiers have relatively similar results and the malicious
detection accuracy could be as high as 96%.
Similar to machine-learning-based spam filtering
solutions, a larger training data set results in bet-
ter performance. We acknowledge that our solution
would incur false positives when actually deployed.
However, the number of false positives can be reduced
by training on larger data sets and constantly updat-
ing training samples (See Section 4.3).
The best performing classifiers in both cases can
be used to label domains by classifying their certifi-
cates (labels are: phishing and legitimate in the first
classifier, and suspicious and non-suspicious in the
second classifier.). The classifiers work by first ex-
tracting the features from the SSL certificates and
then feeding them to the classifier model which gives
the labels as a result. We envision our solution as
a part of larger phishing mitigation system and the
role of our solution is just to label the domains with
what it thinks about the domains certificates. Thus,
the results of our classifiers are served as inputs to
a larger phishing mitigation system that would com-
bine our recommendations with other observations
to provide an overall more accurate judgment. This
larger phishing mitigation system can be either at
the client machines doing the mitigation as the user
browses the Internet or at the server machines tak-
ing a preemptive investigation of some suspicious do-
mains to either blacklist them or block them in case
they turn out to be phishing.
4.3 Classifier Results with Different
Set Sizes
To verify how the data set size would affect the
classifier performance, we use as the negative set the
same Alexa we use in the previous section. But for
the positive set, we use 3 Phishing sets of different
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Classifier Positive Positive Negative Negative
Recall Precision Recall Precision
Decision 0.732 0.819 0.973 0.956
Tree (500)
Decision 0.817 0.827 0.943 0.939
Tree (1000)
Decision 0.826 0.875 0.921 0.888
Tree (2000)
Table 9: Performance of Classifiers - data set
consists of: (a)positive: Phishing certificates (500,
1000, 2000) and (b) negative: Alexa certificates.
Classifier Positive Positive Negative Negative
Recall Precision Recall Precision
Decision 0.895 0.823 0.667 0.785
Tree
Table 10: Performance of Classifiers - data set
consists of: (a)positive: Phishing certificates and
(b) negative: Alexa certificates.
sizes; namely, 500, 1000, and 2000. The ten-fold cross
validation results of Decision Tree is shown in Table
9. We can see as we increase the size of the positive
set, positive precision and recall increase. Thus, a
large size of Phishing set is essential in having a high
Phishing detection accuracy.
4.4 Classifier Results With Minimal
Set of Features
To see how the classifier perform when we use a fea-
ture set that is less vulnerable to being manipulated,
we restrict the feature set to only the sub-features
related to the issuer; namely, issuer common name,
issuer organization and issuer country. We use Alexa
as our negative set and Phishing as our positive set.
Table 10 shows the results of the Decision Tree (the
others are of comparable performance) when we only
use the issuer related sub-features. Even though we
use less features, we still get reasonably good positive
precision and recall.
5 Discussion
Based on measurements presented in previous sec-
tions, we find that a significant percentage of well-
known domains already use HTTPS. It is possible
to harvest their certificates for our classification pur-
pose, without requiring any modifications on the do-
mains’ side. Furthermore, the non-trivial portion
of phishing websites utilizing HTTPS highlights the
need to analyze and correlate information provided
in their certificates.
Using information in certificates. Our results
show significant differences between certificates of
popular domains and those of malicious domains.
Not only is this information alone sufficient to de-
tect fraudulent activities as we have shown, but it is
also a useful component in assessing a website’s de-
gree of trustworthiness, thus improving prior metrics,
such as [50, 21, 15]. Our method should be integrated
with other techniques to improve the effectiveness of
detecting malicious domains.
Keeping state of encountered certificates. We
deliberately chose to conduct our measurements as
general as possible, without relying on user naviga-
tion history or on user specific training data. These
components are fundamental for most current miti-
gation techniques [15, 32]. Moreover, we believe that
keeping track of navigation history is detrimental to
user privacy. However, our work yields effective de-
tection by analyzing certain coarse-grained informa-
tion extracted from server certificates and not specific
to a user’s navigation patterns. This does not violate
user privacy as keeping fine-grained navigation his-
tory would.
Limitations. We acknowledge that additional
data sets of legitimate domains need to be taken
into consideration, e.g. popular websites from DNS
logs in different organizations and countries. Data
sets of typosquatting domains can be strengthened
by additional and more effective name variations.
Also, we acknowledge that our phishing classifier
may incur false positives when actually deployed.
However, this is a common problem to many
machine-learning-based mitigation solutions (e.g.,
spam filtering and intrusion detection based on
machine-learning techniques) and the number of
false positives can be minimized by training the
classifier on larger and more comprehensive data
sets. Our classifier does not provide a complete
standalone solution to the phishing threat since
many domains do not have HTTPS. Instead, inte-
grated with pre-existing solutions (e.g., [50, 21, 15]),
it improves their effectiveness in the context of
potentially critical applications enforcing HTTPS.
How malicious domains will adapt. Web-
fraudsters are diligent and quickly adapt to new se-
curity mechanisms and studies that threaten their
business. We hope that this work will raise the bar
and make it more difficult for web-fraudsters to de-
ceive users. If web-browsers use our classifier to an-
alyze SSL certificate fields, we expect one of two re-
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sponses from web-fraudsters: (1) to acquire legiti-
mate certificates from CAs and leave a paper trail
pointing to ”some person or organization” which is
connected to such malicious activities, (2) to craft
certificates that have similar values to those that are
most common in certificates of legitimate domains.
Some fields/features will be easy to forge with legit-
imate values (e.g., country of issuer, country of sub-
ject, subject common and organization name, valid-
ity period, signature algorithm, serial number ...etc).
For some other fields this will not be possible (issuer
name, signature ...etc) because otherwise the verifi-
cation of the certificate will fail. In either case the
effectiveness of web-fraud will be reduced. Addition-
ally, we show in Section 4.4 how the classifier still
performs well when only relying on issuer related fea-
tures.
6 Related Work
The work in [19] conducted a study to measure the
cryptographic strength of more than 19,000 public
servers running SSL/TLS. The study reported that
many SSL sites still supported the weak SSL 2.0 pro-
tocol. Also, most of the probed servers supported
DES, which is vulnerable to exhaustive search. Some
of the sites used RSA-based authentication with only
512-bit key size, which is insufficient. Nevertheless,
it showed encouraging measurement results, e.g., the
use of AES as default option for most of the servers
that did not support AES. Also, a trend toward using
a stronger cryptographic function has been observed
over two years of probing, despite a slow improve-
ment. In [37], the authors performed a six-month
measurement study on the aftermath of the discov-
ered vulnerability in OpenSSL in May 2008, in or-
der to measure how fast the hosts recovered from the
bug and changed their weak keys into strong ones.
Through the probing of thousands of servers, they
showed that the replacement of the weak keys was
slow. Also, the speed of recovery was shown to be
correlated to different SSL certificate characteristics
such as: CA type, expiry time, and key size. The
article in [29] presented a profiling study of a set of
SSL certificates. Probing around 9,754 SSL servers
and collecting 8,081 SSL certificates, it found that
around 30% of responding servers had weak security
(small key size, supporting only SSL 2.0,...), 10% of
them were already expired and 3% were self-signed.
Netcraft [30] conducts a monthly survey to measure
the certificate validity of Internet servers. Recently,
the study showed that 25% of the sites had their cer-
tificates self-signed and less than half had their certifi-
cates signed by valid CA. Symantec [36] has observed
an increase in the number of URLs abusing SSL cer-
tificates. Only in the period between May and June
2009, 26% of all the SSL certificate attacks have been
performed by fraudulent domains using SSL certifi-
cates. Although our measurement study conducts a
profiling of SSL certificates, our purpose is different
from the ones above. We analyze the certificates to
show how malicious certificates are different from be-
nign ones and to leverage this difference in designing
a mitigation technique.
The importance and danger of web-fraud (such as
phishing and typosquatting) has been recognized in
numerous prior publications, studies and industry re-
ports mainly due to the tremendous financial losses
[26] that it causes. One notable study is [3] which
analyzed the infrastructure used for hosting and sup-
porting Internet scams, including phishing. It used
an opportunistic measurement technique that mined
email messages in real-time, followed the embedded
link structure, and automatically clustered destina-
tion websites using image shingling. In [15], a ma-
chine learning based methodology was proposed for
detecting phishing emails. The methodology was
based on a classifier that detected phishing with 96%
accuracy and false negative rate of 0.1%. Our work
differs since it does not rely on phishing emails which
are sometimes hard to identify. An anti-phishing
browser extension (AntiPhish) was given in [21]. It
kept track of sensitive information and warned the
user whenever the user tried to enter sensitive infor-
mation into untrusted websites. Our classifier can
be easily integrated with AntiPhish. However, An-
tiPhish compromised user privacy by keeping state
of sensitive data. Other anti-phishing proposals re-
lied on trusted devices, such as a user’s cell phone
in [32]. In [23], the authors tackled the problem of
detecting malicious websites by only analyzing their
URLs using machine-learning statistical techniques
on the lexical and host-based features of their URLs.
The proposed solution achieved a prediction accuracy
around 95%. Other studies measured the extent of
typosquatting and suggested mitigation techniques.
Wang, et al. [51] showed that many typosquatting
domains were active and parked with a few parking
services, which served ads on them. Similarly, [6]
showed that, for nearly 57% of original URLs con-
sidered, over 35% of all possible URL variations ex-
isted on the Internet. Surprisingly, over 99% of such
similarly-named websites were considered phony. [22]
devised a methodology for identifying ads-portals and
parked domains and found out that around 25% of
(two-level) .com and .net domains were ads-portals
and around 40% of those were typosquatting. McAfee
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also studied the typosquatting problem in [20]. A set
of 1.9 million single-error typos was generated and
127, 381 suspected typosquatting domains were dis-
covered. Alarmingly, the study also found that ty-
posquatters targeted children-oriented domains. Fi-
nally, McAfee added to its extension site advisor [25]
some capabilities for identifying typosquatters. In
[24], the authors proposed a technique to counter-
against phishing and pharming attacks that is based
on mutual authentication which can be easily adopted
in the current systems. In [43], the authors proposed
an anomaly detection technique that is based on hid-
den Markov models which is very suitable to Win-
dows environment.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has
explored the web-fraud problem in the context of
HTTPS and proposed analyzing server-side SSL cer-
tificates in more detail. Our work yields a detailed
analysis of SSL certificates from different domain
families and a classifier that detects web-fraud do-
mains based on their certificates.
Finally, some usable security studies have at-
tempted to measure effectiveness of available anti-
phishing tools and security warnings. User studies
analyzing the effectiveness of browser warning mes-
sages indicated that an overwhelming percentage (up
to 70-80% in some cases) of users ignored them.
This observation—confirmed by recent research re-
sults (e.g., [42] and [12])— might explain the un-
expected high percentage of expired and self signed
certificates that we found in the results of all our
data sets. Furthermore, [52] evaluated available anti-
phishing tools and points out that only 1 out of 10
popular anti-phishing tool identified more than 90%
of phishing URLs correctly. Also, [49] pointed out
that users failed to pay attention to the toolbar or
explained away tool’s warning if the content of web
pages looked legitimate. Similarly, [48] highlighted,
through eyetracker data, that users commonly looked
at lock icons, but rarely used the certificate informa-
tion. As a result, one may wonder about the incentive
for phishers and typosquatters to utilize SSL certifi-
cates. We believe that our classifier can be used to-
gether with available tools, e.g., AntiPhish [21], which
keeps track of sensitive information and warns the
user whenever users enter sensitive information into
insecure websites. In this case, phishers need to pro-
vide SSL certificates to bypass the AntiPhish block.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the prevalence of HTTPS in
popular and legitimate domains as well as in the con-
text of web-fraud, i.e., phishing and typosquatting.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort
to analyze information in SSL certificates to profile
domains and assess their degree of trustworthiness.
We design and build a machine-learning-based clas-
sifier that identifies fraudulent domains that utilize
HTTPS. The classifier solely relies on SSL certifi-
cates of such domains, thus preserving user privacy.
Our work can be integrated with existing detection
techniques to improve their effectiveness. Finally, we
believe that our results may serve as a motivation
to increase the adoption of HTTPS. We believe that
aside from its intended benefits of confidentiality and
authenticity, HTTPS can help identify web-fraud do-
mains.
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